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Sanitary Landfill Permits in Illinois: State
Preemption of Home Rule Zoning Powers
INTRODUCTION
Since the early nineteenth century, Illinois has had a strong tradi-
tion of narrowly construing local governmental powers.' The 1870
Illinois constitution lacked a local government provision, and the
theory of legislative supremacy known as Dillon's Rule' placed the
ultimate authority over local affairs in state government.3 This his-
torical development was expressly overruled by the Local Govern-
ment Article of the 1970 Illinois constitution,4 which contains a
specific provision for home rule exercise in Illinois. The drafters of
the recent constitution expressly intended that article VII's home
rule provisions be broadly interpreted and liberally construed. In-
deed, home rule under the 1970 constitution is presently considered
the broadest provision in effect.7 In Kannellos v. Cook County,'
Justice Kluczynski recognized that
[tihe concept of home rule adopted under the provisions of the
1970 constitution was designed to drastically alter the relationship
which previously existed between local and State government. For-
merly, the actions of local governmental units were limited to those
powers which were expressly authorized, implied or essential in
carrying out the legislature's grant of authority. Under the home-
rule provisions of the 1970 constitution, however, the power of the
General Assembly to limit the actions of home-rule units has been
circumscribed and home-rule units have been constitutionally del-
egated greater autonomy in the determination of their government
and affairs. To accomplish this independence the constitution con-
1. ILLINOIS SIXTH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, COMMITTEE
PROPOSALS, vol. VII, at 1622 (1969-70) [hereinafter cited as COMMITTEE PROPOSALS].
2. 1 J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 448 (5th ed. 1911):
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation
possesses and can exercise the following powers and no others: First, those granted
in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied or incident to the
powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the de-
clared objects and purposes of the corporation-not simply convenient but indis-
pensable.
3. COMMITTEE PROPOSALS, supra note 1, at 1603.
4. ILL. CONST. art. VII.
5. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6.
6. COMMITTEE PROPOSALS, supra note 1, at 1593.
7. Parkhurst, Article VII-Local Government, 52 CHI. B. REc. 94, 99 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Article VII].
8. 53 Il. 2d 161, 290 N.E.2d 240 (1972).
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ferred substantial powers upon home-rule units subject only to
those restrictions imposed or authorized therein.'
The enactment of the 1970 constitution generated a belief that
home rule would gain wide acceptance in the local government units
and in the courts of Illinois.'" However, the recent decisions of Illi-
nois courts in Carlson v. Village of Worth" and Carlson v.
Briceland'" have diminished the expectations of local government
units in the continued viability of the home rule provision. These
decisions permitted the State of Illinois, through the Environmental
Protection Act," to preempt the power of home rule units to estab-
lish mandatory zoning regulations applicable to sanitary landfills.
It is this author's contention that these holdings are erroneous and,
if followed, would lead to the emasculation of home rule in Illinois.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT
The Environmental Protection Act" became effective July 1,
1970, and provides that its purpose is to "establish a unified, state-
wide program. . . to restore, protect and enhance the quality of the
environment."'" Prior to that date, Illinois had lacked an effective
environmental protection program. Jurisdiction over the various
forms of pollution control was scattered among several administra-
tive boards, resulting in an inability to apply effective sanctions.
The Environmental Protection Act was intended to cure these short-
comings and unify the administrative structure.
The Act established three administrative agencies, each having
authority to regulate some aspect of pollution control throughout
the state. The agencies are the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA),' 6 the Pollution Control Board,'7 and the Institute for Envi-
ronmental Quality.'"
The Act provides, inter alia, for the promulgation of regulations
and the issuance of permits for the development of sanitary land-
9. Id. at 166, 290 N.E.2d at 243.
10. See Parkhurst, Two Years Later: The Status of Home Rule in Illinois, 71 U. ILL. BULL.
INST. GOV'T PUB. Ar. 21, 24 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Two Years Later]. See also Biebel,
Home Rule in Illinois After Two Years: An Uncertain Beginning, 6 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC.
253, 329 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Home Rule in Illinois].
11. 62 Il1. 2d 406, 343 N.E.2d 493 (1975).
12. 75 L 12530 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co., decided Aug. 9, 1976).
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1112, §§ 1001-51 (1975).
14. hIL. REV. STAT. ch. 111/2, §§ 1001-51 (1975). For an in-depth study of the Act, see
Klein, Pollution Control in Illinois-The Formative Years, 22 DE PAUL L. REV. 759 (1973).
15. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, § 1002(b) (1975).
16. Id. at § 1004.
17. Id. at § 1005.
18. Id. at § 1006.
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fills, but fails to explicitly declare that home rule zoning ordinances
are not applicable to such landfills. The Act establishes a unified
program of land pollution and refuse disposal regulation, and is
designed to prevent both the pollution and the misuse of land. 9 No
person can engage in a refuse disposal operation without a permit
issued by the Environmental Protection Agency." The Pollution
Control Board has authority to establish standards for the location,
design, and operation of refuse disposal sites." Furthermore, the
Board, in establishing regulations pursuant to the Act, is authorized
to take into consideration the character of surrounding land uses
and zoning classifications.2 In addition to requiring the acquisition
of a permit prior to the construction and operation of a sanitary
landfill, the Act also permits the EPA to attach conditions to the
landfill permit necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Act. 23
THE DECISIONS: WORTH AND BRICELAND
In Carlson v. Village of Worth,24 the plaintiff was issued a permit
by the Environmental Protection Agency to operate a sanitary land-
fill within the Village of Worth-a non-home rule municipality.
Following the EPA's issuance of a permit to the plaintiff, the Village
of Worth enacted an environmental protection ordinance requiring
a village permit to operate a sanitary landfill. The issuance of the
village permit was conditioned upon compliance with the environ-
mental ordinance and the village zoning ordinance. 5
Plaintiff brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment that
the village ordinance was invalid. Summary judgment was entered
for plaintiff. The appellate court noted that the case involved a non-
home rule municipality 2 and affirmed the trial court's holding. The
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed in a four to three decision and held
that local regulation of sanitary landfills was preempted by the
Illinois Environmental Protection Act." The supreme court did not
19. Id. at § 1020.
20. Id. at § 1021(e).
21. Id. at § 1022(a).
22. Id. at § 1027.
23. Id. at § 1039.
24. 62 II. 2d 406, 343 N.E.2d 493 (1975).
25. Id. at 408, 343 N.E.2d at 494.
26. Carlson v. Village of Worth, 25 IIl. App. 3d 315, 317, 322 N.E. 2d 852, 853 (1974):
Defendant, having a population of less than 25,000, is not a home rule unit under
article 7, section 6 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, and has not elected to acquire
that status by referendum. As a result, defendant has only those powers which have
been delegated to such entities by statute.
27. 62 11. 2d 406, 408, 343 N.E.2d 493, 494 (1975).
19771
Loyola University Law Journal
distinguish the preemptive effect of the Environmental Protection
Act upon home rule and non-home rule units. In effect, this distinc-
tion disregards the constitutional home rule provision and facili-
tates the dissolution of home rule in Illinois.
Carlson v. Briceland5 involved a conflict between the Environ-
mental Protection Act and the Cook County zoning ordinance en-
acted pursuant to its home rule authority. The Briceland plaintiffs
brought a declaratory judgment action against the EPA and its
director seeking to invalidate two conditions contained in an EPA
permit. Both conditions required compliance with local zoning ordi-
nances prior to the development of a solid waste disposal site.'9 The
plaintiffs contended that the Environmental Protection Act did not
authorize the EPA to condition permits upon compliance with local
zoning ordinances. Plaintiffs further claimed that the state was en-
dowed with the exclusive authority to regulate sanitary landfills,
and that the two conditions delegated authority to local units of
government in derogation of the Act.
Cook County was granted the right to intervene, whereupon it
brought a countersuit alleging that the sanitary landfill site was
within unincorporated Cook County and, therefore, subject to the
Cook County Zoning Ordinance. The county further alleged that the
plaintiffs failed to obtain a special use permit required by the zoning
ordinance. 0 The court dismissed the counter-complaint and granted
summary judgment to the plaintiff declaring the two contested per-
mit conditions invalid. However, the validity of the permit was
upheld .31
Subsequently, Cook County moved to void the permit and re-
mand the controversy to the EPA for a rehearing. The court granted
the motion and remanded the cause to the EPA for an evaluation
28. 75 L 12530 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co., decided Aug. 9,1976). Since Briceland, other cases have
arisen involving sanitary landfills and the application to them of local zoning ordinances. See
John Sexton Co. v. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, PCB 75-478 (filed Sept., 1976).
29. Permit No. 1975-39-DE was issued by the Environmental Protection Agency on May
29, 1975. The two conditions in question were special condition 1 and general condition 4.
Special condition 1 reads as follows:
Construction work on, or development of, the proposed site is specifically prohib-
ited until the permittee submits proof to the Agency that the site has been zoned
for, has received a special use permit for, or is in compliance with all zoning laws
and ordinances for use as specified in this permit.
General condition 4 states that:
This permit, . . . (c) does not release the permittee from compliance with other
applicable statutes of the State of Illinois, or with applicable local laws, regulations
or zoning ordinances.
30. Carlson v. Briceland, 75 L 12530 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co., decided Aug. 9, 1976) (counter-
complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief filed on November 10, 1975).
31. Id. (Judge Berg's court order of November 26, 1975).
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of the suitability of the site for use as a sanitary landfill.32 There-
after, the Agency reviewed the site's suitability and issued a supple-
mental permit. 3 The supplemental permit effectively rendered
moot the defendant's argument that the EPA failed to consider land
use and zoning factors. In ruling on the county's motion to vacate
judgment on the counter-complaint, the court dismissed the cause
between the plaintiffs and the EPA. As between the county and the
plaintiffs, the court entered judgment for plaintiffs. 3'
The controversy created by these two decisions was anticipated
in the dissenting opinion of Justice Underwood in Worth. Justice
Underwood feared the extension of the majority's reasoning to home
rule units. He stated that the facts of the Worth case were inapplica-
ble to home rule units, since such governmental bodies are explicitly
delegated their powers by the 1970 constitution. Such powers can
only be limited by legislative action taken pursuant to section 6 of
article VII. Hence, to protect home rule units from the scope of
Worth, Justice Underwood proposed a two-step analysis to deter-
mine whether a home rule unit has the power to enact a given
ordinance: "(1) Does the subject matter pertain to its government
and affairs? (2) If so, has that power been limited or denied it by
the General Assembly under 6(g) or 6(h)?''5
Since Worth did not involve a home rule municipality, the con-
clusion is inescapable that the Worth holding is not precedent for
limiting a home rule unit's power.
THE SCOPE OF HOME RULE AUTHORITY
Home rule units derive the authority to enact a home rule zoning
ordinance36 from section 6(a) of article VII of the 1970 Illinois Con-
stitution:
A County which has a chief executive officer elected by the electors
of the county and any municipality which has a population of more
than 25,000 are home rule units. Other municipalities may elect
32. Id. (Judge Berg's court order of March 22, 1976).
33. Supplemental Permit No. 76-263 was issued May 21, 1976 by the Environmental
Protection Agency.
34. Carlson v. Briceland, 75 L. 12530 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co., decided Aug. 9, 1976) (Judge
Berg's court order of August 9, 1976). Cook County is presently appealing the circuit court
decision.
35. 62 Ill. 2d 406, 425, 343 N.E.2d 493, 503 (1976).
36. Cook County, Ill., Zoning Ordinance, Ordaining Clause (1976):
This comprehensive amendment is passed pursuant to Cook County's Home Rule
Powers as are set forth in Article VII, Section 6 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution,
and in no way derives its authority from Illinois Revised Statutes, Chapter 34,
Paragraphs 3151 through 3161 (1973).
19771
Loyola University Law Journal
by referendum to become home rule units. Except as limited by
this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform
any function pertaining to its government and affairs including,
but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the
public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and
to incur debt.37
Home rule in Illinois, the product of the Sixth Illinois Constitu-
tional Convention, became effective July 1, 1971-one year after the
Environmental Protection Act was enacted. Section 6(a) grants
home rule units broad authority to "exercise any power and perform
any function pertaining to its government and affairs." This section
was designed to grant home rule units the broadest powers permissi-
ble within the parameters of the 1970 constitution. In this regard it
was considered by its drafters to be unique.8 Furthermore, to pro-
tect against the type of judicial preemption exercised in Briceland,
section 6(a) specifically sets forth four basic powers falling within
the general grant of authority: (1) the general police powers, (2) the
power to license, (3) the power to tax, and (4) the power to incur
debt.3"
The constitutional debates provide the most authoritative guid-
ance when construing the 1970 Illinois constitution. 0 Article VII of
the constitution was enacted in the same basic form as the draft
submitted to the convention by the Local Government Committee.
It is this committee's report that most clearly encompasses the
drafter's intentions in article VII. 4'
The Record of Proceedings of the Sixth Illinois Constitutional
Convention illustrates the framers' intent to grant home rule units
broad police powers. The Local Government Committee's report,
while including restrictions upon the power to tax, to control the
local debt, and to license for revenue, fails to subject the police
37. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a).
38. COMMrEE PROPOSALS, vol. VII, supra note 1, at 1621.
39. Id. at 1622, where the committee report states:
Standing alone, the general grant of local powers would be subject to interpretation
and possible limitation in important respects by the courts . . . . To avoid this
danger, the Committee believes it desirable to specify those basic areas of power
which are most important and which, without question, are included in the more
general language of the proposed section.
See Baum, A Tentative Survey of Illinois Home Rule (Part I): Powers and Limitations, 1972
U. ILL. L.F. 137, 141 [hereinafter cited as Part I].
40. See People ex rel. Keenan v. McGuane, 13 Ill. 2d 520, 532, 150 N.E.2d 168, 172 (1958),
where the Illinois Supreme Court stated: "The primary object of construction of the consti-
tution is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the framers."
41. Baum, The Scope of Home Rule: The Views of the Con-Con Local Government
Committee, 59 ILL. B.J. 814, 815 (1971).
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powers to any such restrictions. 2 In commenting upon the need for
granting general and specific powers to home rule units, the report
affirms that its purpose was to insure that home rule units receive
"directly under the constitution the broadest possible range of pow-
ers" to solve their problems. 3 The committee report further estab-
lishes that there were no objections to the vesting of broad police
powers in home rule units. To this end section 6(m) of article VII
requires that the powers and functions of home rule units be liber-
ally construed." Section 6(m) reverses that portion of Dillon's Rule
requiring the court, when in doubt, to resolve questions of local
authority against the local governmental entity.
Since Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co.,4' county zoning ordi-
nances have been recognized as a proper exercise of the police
powers so long as their purpose is the protection of the public health,
safety, comfort, morals, and general welfare.4" Moreover, the
committee report establishes that there were no objections to the
vesting of broad police powers in home rule units. 7 The Amber
Realty rationale coupled with the committee's intent to extend the
police powers compels the conclusion that the power to zone is a
permissible exercise of home rule authority. The Illinois Appellate
Court in Johnny Bruce Co. v. City of Champaign" held that the
grant of power to home rule units under section 6(a) includes the
power to zone.49 This decision illustrates the trend in a number of
states which have determined that under the various home rule
provisions zoning is a local concern.50 Additionally, in Cain v. Amer-
ican National Bank,5 the Illinois court stated that since the state
42. COMMirrEE PROPOSALS, vol. VII, supra note 1, at 1601. But see COMMIT'rE PROPOSALS,
vol. VII, supra note 1, at 1621, which may raise some doubts as to the authority of home rule
units to regulate land use:
[T]he powers of home rule units relate to their own problems, not to those of the
state or the nation. Their powers should not extend to such matters as divorce, real
property law, trusts, contracts, etc. which are generally recognized as falling within
the competence of state rather than local authorities.
43. Id. at 1619.
44. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(m):
Powers and functions of home rule units shall be construed liberally.
45. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
46. Id. at 387. See also the Cook County Zoning Ordinance, which specifically declares
its purposes to "promote and to protect the public health, safety, morals, comfort, conveni-
ence, and the general welfare of the people." Cook Co., Ill., Zoning Ordinance art. 2, § 1
(1976).
47. COMMITTEE PROPOSALS, vol. VII, supra note 1, at 1623.
48. 24 Ill. App. 3d 900, 321 N.E.2d 469 (1974).
49. Id. at 903, 321 N.E.2d at 471.
50. Kratovil & Ziegweid, Illinois Municipal Home Rule and Urban Land-A Test Run of
the New Constitution, 22 DE PAUL L. REv. 359, 380 (1972).
51. Cain v. American Nat'l Bank, 26 Ill. App. 3d 574, 325 N.E.2d 799 (1975).
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zoning enabling statute52 is not applicable to home rule municipali-
ties, the City of Chicago derives its power to zone from section 6(a).53
Similarly, the Illinois county zoning enabling statute" is inapplica-
ble to home rule counties. Hence, Cook County looks to section 6(a)
of article VII for its grant of authority.55
THE PREEMPTION PROVISIONS
The legislative limitations within section 6 of article VII, which
are also referred to as the preemption provisions, define the balance
of power between home rule units and state government. These
provisions are paragraphs (g), (h), and (i) of section 6:
(g) The General Assembly by a law approved by the vote of three-
fifths of the members elected to each house may deny or limit the
power to tax and any other power or function of a home rule unit
not exercised or performed by the State other than a power or
function specified in subsection (1) of this section.
(h) The General Assembly may provide specifically by law for the
exclusive exercise by the State of any power or function of a home
rule unit other than a taxing power or a power or function specified
in subsection (1) of this Section.
(i) Home rule units may exercise and perform concurrently with
the State any power or function of a home rule unit to the extent
that the General Assembly by law does not specifically limit the
concurrent exercise or specifically declare the State's exercise to be
exclusive.
A major concern of several members of the Local Government
Committee was the problem of implied preemption-"the denial or
limitation of a local power merely because state legislation has been
passed relating to the same area of activity.""6 The chairman of the
Local Government Committee, John Parkhurst, has suggested that
the success of home rule in Illinois is dependent upon the judiciary's
interpretation of the preemption provision. However, most decisions
in other states have upheld the power of the state, thereby emascu-
lating home rule power.57 Judicial limitations imposed on home rule
in other states should not be persuasive in Illinois due to Illinois'
unique approach to the problem.58 Sections 6(g), (h), and (i) of
52. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-13-1 (1975).
53. 26 Il. App. 3d 574, 581, 325 N.E.2d 799, 805 (1975).
54. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, § 3151 (1975).
55. See Cook County Zoning Ordinance, supra note 36.
56. Home Rule in Illinois, supra note 10, at 282.
57. Two Years Later, supra note 10, at 21.
58. COMMITTEE PROPOSALS, vol. VII, supra note 1, at 1621.
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article VII are more specific than any other similar state constitu-
tional provision. The 1970 constitution was drafted so that the need
for broad judicial interpretation would be reduced to a minimum.59
The specific language was selected to insure that legislative re-
straints upon home rule authority would not be misconstrued by
judicial interpretation. " If the Illinois General Assembly disap-
proves of specific activity undertaken by a home rule unit, sections
6(g), (h), and (i) define the manner in which the legislature may act.
The General Assembly has the authority to limit any home rule
activity, except for activity relating to special assessment and spe-
cial service districts."' The vote required to enact legislation in home
rule units is dependent upon two considerations: the nature of the
local power affected and the intention of the General Assembly to
exclusively govern that area of activity.
Section 6(g) of article VII enables the General Assembly to deny
or limit any power of a home rule unit, including the power to tax.
Where the state fails to exercise a power or to perform a function in
a home rule unit, section 6(g) imposes upon the Illinois legislature
the burden of a three-fifths majority vote. The purpose of section
6(g) is to protect home rule units from indiscriminate action by the
state which would effectively prevent local government from exer-
cising its section 6(a) powers. "
These provisions are balanced against section 6(h) which permits
the General Assembly to preempt any home rule power except the
power to tax. This authority to enact preemptive legislation requires
a simple majority vote of the Illinois legislature. Although section
6(h) does not require that the state engage in activities in the
preempted area, this requirement may be implied from section
6(g).613 The committee suggests that the state may reserve exclusive
jurisdiction by enacting state-wide regulatory legislation. 4 The
committee report provides: "It should be noted that under para-
59. Article VII, supra note 7, at 100. Chairman Parkhurst states:
These sections attempt to spell out, in a more specific way than in any other
state constitution, the power relationship between state and home rule unit. The
intent is to reduce to a minimum the vast gray area that has led to endless litigation
in other home rule states, and left to the courts the devilish problem of defining
what is a "local power" vs. what is a matter of "state wide concern." Needless to
say, without a preemption system that sets up a means for solving the conflicts
between state statutes and local ordinances, the courts tend to hold that the sover-
eign state wins, and home rule has thus been rendered impotent in many states.
60. Part I, supra note 39, at 156.
61. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(1).
62. COMMITTEE PROPOSALS, vol. VII, supra note 1, at 1642.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1644.
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graphs 3.2(b) and (c) [enacted as sections 6(h) and (i) of article VII
with slight modification] the state can act-and express exclusiv-
ity-in many ways.""5
The drafters of the 1970 constitution contemplated, however, that
this exercise of preemptive power by the state government would be
pursuant to rules and regulations adopted under sections 6(h) and
6(i). Since the Environmental Protection Act was adopted one year
prior to the effective date of article VII, the statute cannot claim
exclusivity by mandate pursuant to section 6(h). 6 Furthermore, it
is difficult to perceive how the EPA can claim preemption under
section 6(h), since the Act does not grant the EPA exclusive power
to zone within the state, nor has the EPA attempted to establish
zoning ordinances. 7
Section 6(i) recognizes that home rule units, in the absence of a
specific exclusion, can act concurrently with the state. The purpose
of this provision is to prevent the preemption of home rule powers
by judicial interpretation of non-existent legislative intent. There-
fore, the mere fact that the state has established a state-wide pro-
gram for environmental protection should not lead to the invalida-
tion of zoning ordinances regulating landfill locations. 9
When the preemption provisions are viewed as a whole, it is clear
that for a home rule unit's power to be usurped there must be a
statement of exclusivity from state government in addition to the
vote required by the particular constitutional provision. The Illinois
Supreme Court in Rozner v. Korshak ° held that a statute purport-
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111/2, §§ 1001-51 (1975).
67. See Baum, A Tentative Survey of Illinois Home Rule (Part II): Legislative Control,
Transition Problems, and Intergovernmental Conflict, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 559, 570 [hereinafter
cited as Part II]. The Committee comments make it difficult to rationally interpret sections
6(g), (h), and (i). Further, the passage would render section 6(g) practically meaningless,
which would be inconsistent with the intent of the constitution. Hence, the Committee's
"overly broad interpretation should be rejected ....
68. COMMrrrEE PROPOSALS, vol. VII, supra note 1, at 1645:
The solution proposed here is novel and unique. It proposes, as it must, to preserve
state sovereignty when the General Assembly expresses its intent to prohibit local
government activity. But absent such an expression of intent, local governments
are left free to complement the state activity. The purpose of distinguishing be-
tween statutes which express exclusively [sic] and those which do not is to mini-
mize the area where courts might have to struggle to find legislative intent. It is a
guideline to the courts that concurrent local action is to be permitted unless a
contrary legislative intent is expressed.
69. Part II, supra note 67, at 572:
The fact that the state has occupied some field of governmental endeavor, or that
home rule ordinances are in some way inconsistent with state statutes, is not in
itself sufficient to invalidate the local ordinances.
70. 55 II1. 2d 430, 303 N.E.2d 389 (1973).
[Vol. 8
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ing to restrict a home rule unit's authority must specifically declare
this intent.7' The Illinois Supreme Court has very recently reaf-
firmed this position in Stryker v. Village of Oak Park,7" where the
court acknowledged that: "A statute intended to limit or deny home
rule powers must contain an express statement to that effect."" In
the absence of such specificity, section 6(i) provides that the home
rule unit can concurrently engage in the activity with the state.
In addition, section 9 of the constitution's transition schedule
provides that statutes enacted prior to the 1970 constitution shall
remain effective unless inconsistent with affirmative home rule stat-
utes passed pursuant to section 6 of article VII.74 The Illinois Su-
preme Court has held that pre-existing statutory limitations do not
restrict the authority of home rule units in the absence of affirma-
tive steps taken subsequent to the adoption of the 1970 constitution,
pursuant to the provisions of sections 6(g), (h), and (i).71 It has been
argued that "permitting preexisting statutes to prevail over home
rule powers would virtually destroy home rule as contemplated in
the constitution. '76
71. Id. at 435, 303 N.E.2d at 392:
While section 6(g) of article VII authorized the General Assembly, by a law
approved by three-fifths of the members of each house, to deny or limit the power
of a home-rule unit, it does not follow that every statute relating to the powers of
municipalities generally will, if adopted by a three-fifths vote, have a bearing upon
the powers of those municipalities which are home-rule units. The powers which
those units have received under section 6 of article VII of the constitution of 1970
are in addition to the powers heretofore or hereafter granted by the General Assem-
bly to other municipalities. The kind of inadvertent restriction of the authority of
home-rule units for which the plaintiff contends can be avoided if statutes that are
intended to limit or deny home-rule powers contain an express statement to that
effect. The statute before us contains no indication of a restrictive purpose, and we
hold that it had no restrictive effect.
72. 62 Il. 2d 523, 343 N.E.2d 919 (1976).
73. Id. at 528, 343 N.E.2d at 923 (citations omitted).
74. ILL. CONST. transition schedule, § 9:
The rights and duties of all public bodies shall remain as if this Constitution had
not been adopted with the exception of such changes as are contained in this
Constitution. All laws, ordinances, regulations are rules of court not contrary to, or
inconsistent with, the provisions of this Constitution shall remain in force, until
they shall expire by their own limitation or shall be altered or repealed pursuant
to this Constitution ...
75. Kanellos v. County of Cook, 53 Il1. 2d 161, 290 N.E.2d 240 (1972); People ex rel.
Hanrahan v. Beck, 54 Ill. 2d 561, 301 N.E.2d 281 (1973); Rozner v. Korshak, 55 II1. 2d 430,
303 N.E.2d 389 (1973); Clarke v. Village of Arlington Heights, 57 111. 2d 50, 309 N.E.2d 576
(1974); Peters v. City of Springfield, 57 111. 2d 142, 311 N.E.2d 107 (1974); Mulligan v. Dunne,
61 111. 2d 544, 338 N.E.2d 6 (1975); Stryker v. Village of Oak Park, 62 Ill. 2d 523, 343 N.E.2d
919 (1976).
76. Part II, supra note 67, at 578.
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JUDICIAL RESPONSE
Recent court tests involving conflicts between home rule statutes
and previously enacted state statutes have been supportive of the
home rule unit. The Illinois Supreme Court recognized home rule
units' authority over matters pertaining to government and affairs
by "clearly defining the principle that home rule units may su-
persede the apparent effects of state laws which have not been
enacted according to the constitutional provisions for preempting
home rule powers.""
The leading case in this area is Kanellos v. Cook County,7 8 which
has been characterized by the chairman of the Local Government
Committee as finally placing an end to any doubts of the continuing
effect of statutes enacted prior to the constitution.79 Kanellos
involved a pre-home rule statute requiring a county referendum as
a condition precedent to the issuance of general obligation bonds.80
In August of 1971 the Cook County Board adopted a resolution
calling for the issuance of $10,000,000 in general obligation bonds
without first establishing the consent of the voters of Cook County
by way of referendum. The action was brought to enjoin the issu-
ance of the bonds on the ground that the previously enacted statute
was in full force and effect.8'
The supreme court held that the pre-existing statute was in-
applicable to Cook County as a home rule unit because the statute
was enacted prior to the 1970 constitution.82 Since state government
failed to comply with the provisions of section 6 of article VII, the
referendum requirement as it applied to Cook County was invalid.
Another supreme court decision, People ex rel. Hanrahan v.
Beck,3 involved a dispute between a pre-1970 constitution statute
and a Cook County home rule ordinance. The Cook County Board
of Commissioners adopted an ordinance creating the office of Cook
77. Froehlich, Illinois Home Rule in the Courts, 63 ILL. B.J. 320 (1975).
78. 53 Ill. 2d 161, 290 N.E.2d 240 (1972).
79. Two Years Later, supra note 10, at 24.
80. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 34, § 306 (1971). This was also referred to in the case as section 40
of the Counties Act.
81. The second issue in the case was whether a referendum was required before a home
rule unit could issue general obligation bonds.
82. 53 III. 2d 161, 166, 290 N.E.2d 240, 243 (1972):
We therefore hold that this statute is inapplicable as applied to a home-rule county.
It was enacted prior to and not in anticipation of the constitution of 1970 which
introduced the concepts of home-rule and the related limitation of section 6(g) and
6(h). Such considerations were totally foreign in the contemplation of legislation
adopted prior to the 1970 constitution. The statute is therefore inconsistent with
the provisions of section 6(g) and the transition schedule.
83. 54 Ill. 2d 561, 301 N.E.2d 281 (1973).
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County Comptroller in lieu of a prior state statute mandating that
the Cook County Clerk perform the duties and functions of the
comptroller.8 The county ordinance specifically acknowledged that
it was intended to supersede the existing statute. The court, relying
extensively on its Kanellos decision, stated:
We hold that the Cook County Board, acting pursuant to its home-
rule power found in section 6(a), has authority to transfer powers,
duties and functions among county officers even to the extent that
such exercise conflicts with a statute enacted prior to the adoption
of the 1970 constitution unless otherwise limited by legislative ac-
tion or a positive constitutional restriction. 5
The Beck case is significant because it expanded the holding of
Kanellos. In Kanellos the court found that the existing statute con-
flicted with the home rule provisions of the 1970 constitution, and
was, therefore, displaced under section 9 of the transition schedule.
The court in Beck, however, upheld the county's home rule powers
without a finding that the county clerk's responsibilities under the
statute conflicted with the constitution."
In Peters v. City of Springfield,7 the supreme court fortified
Kanellos and Beck:
We hold that the doctrine of Kanellos and Beck is applicable to
the ordinance, and that in its enactment the defendant City did
not contravene the provisions of section 6(i) of article VII. "
84. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, § 1142 (1971).
85. 54 Ill. 2d 561 at 565, 301 N.E.2d at 283.
86. Home Rule in Illinois, supra note 10, at 328.
87. 57 11. 2d 142, 311 N.E.2d 107 (1974). The court held that a home rule unit, pursuant
to the home rule powers of section 6(a) of article VII of the 1970 constitution, can alter the
mandatory retirement age of its policemen and firemen, since the General Assembly has not
specifically limited the concurrent exercise of this power nor has it declared the state's
exercise of this power to be exclusive.
88. Id. at 149, 311 N.E.2d at 111. Other Illinois Supreme Court cases in accord wih this
position are Clarke v. Village of Arlington Heights, 57 I1. 2d 50, 309 N.E.2d 576 (1974) (two
priorly enacted sections of the Illinois Municipal Code had not preempted the village's home
rule ordinance); Mulligan v. Dunne, 61 111. 2d 544, 338 N.E.2d 6 (1975) (the state statute
providing for the taxation and regulation of the liquor industry did not express exclusivity
and therefore Cook County's home rule ordinance providing a tax on the retail sale of alco-
holic beverages was upheld); Rozner v. Korshak, 55 Ill. 2d 430, 303 N.E.2d 389 (1973) (in
holding that the City of Chicago, a home rule unit, could constitutionally enact its Wheel
Tax Ordinance, pre-existing statutes are inapplicable to home rule units); and Stryker v.
Village of Oak Park, 62 I1. 2d 523, 527, 343 N.E.2d 919, 922 (1976), where Justice Goldenhersh
affirmed the holdings of the preceding cases:
Since the adoption of the Constitution of 1970 this court has consistently held
that an ordinance enacted by a home rule unit under the grant of power found in
section 6(a) supersedes a conflicting statute enacted prior to the effective date of
the Constitution.
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It is evident that the decisional law prior to Briceland severely lim-
ited the effect of priorly enacted statutes upon home rule activities.
Briceland marks a departure from this well established precedent.
The Environmental Protection Act, which was not enacted pur-
suant to the 1970 Illinois constitution, cannot act to preempt a home
rule unit's power to zone sanitary landfills.
LEGISLATIVE REACTION
The court's decision in Carlson v. Village of Worth, 9 and its sub-
sequent application in Carlson v. Briceland, ° have raised doubts in
the minds of Illinois legislators regarding the scope of the home rule
power under the 1970 constitution. This trepidation is reflected by
the introduction of two bills in the General Assembly, both of which
seek to amend the Environmental Protection Act in order to expand
local authority.'
House Bill 3851 is a Republican sponsored bill which amends
sections 21, 22, 30, 31, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, and 44 of the Environmental
Protection Act . 2 The amended section 39 would require that the
EPA condition the issuance of permits for the development of sani-
tary landfills upon compliance with local zoning requirements of the
governing unit within which the landfill is located. An exception is
provided for sanitary landfills operated by the state or federal
governments.
The Democratic sponsored bill, House Bill 3955, has a broader
scope than its Republican counterpart in that it relates to all
aspects of pollution, and not specifically sanitary landfills. The bill
states that nothing within the Environmental Protection Act is
intended to limit the power of any unit of local government to pass
and enforce any ordinance. To the extent that such power is also
exercised by the Environmental Protection Agency or the Pollution
Control Board, that power is to be exercised concurrently. Further-
more, it is clear from the language of the synopsis of the bill that
the intent of its drafters was to provide counties with the authority
to pass and enforce zoning ordinances which would be applicable to
sanitary landfills, so long as such ordinances comply with the mini-
mum requirements of the Environmental Protection Act.
Commentators have expressed the doctrine of Kanellos and Beck as stating:
A pre-1970-constitution law may be inconsistent with the constitution in the face
of a conflicting home rule ordinance, and therefore the ordinance prevails over the
law.
Froehlich, Illinois Home Rule in the Courts, 63 ILL. B.J. 320, 321 (1975).
89. 62 Ill. 2d 406, 343 N.E.2d 493 (1976).
90. 75 L 12530 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co., decided Aug. 9, 1976).
91. H.B. 3851 and H.B. 3955, 79th Gen. Assembly (1976).
92. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1111-2, §§ 1001-51 (1975).
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While both bills passed the House, they are presently stalled in
the Local Government Affairs Committee of the Senate. Even
though most observers believe that the legislature will resolve this
conflict, one sponsor of the remedial legislation stated that he be-
lieves neither bill will come before the full senate in the near fu-
ture.93
CONCLUSION
The drafters of the Local Government Article clearly intended
that any power which came within section 6(a) of article VII could
only be limited by legislative action taken subsequent to the adop-
tion of the 1970 constitution and passed pursuant to sections 6(g)
and 6(h). 4 Even though the Environmental Protection Act asserts
that its purpose is to establish a unified state-wide system of envi-
ronmental protection," the Act does not portend to bring zoning
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State of Illinois. Therefore,
the sole preemption provision upon which the Act could rely is
section 6(g), which requires a three-fifths vote by both houses of the
General Assembly in order to deny or limit any power or function
of a home rule unit. However, no such rare act by the legislature is
likely to occur until there has been an enunciation of such home rule
powers or functions. Furthermore, the Act contains no specific dec-
laration of an intent to deny or limit the county's home rule powers,
as required by the decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court.
Due to cases such as Carlson v. Briceland, the real problem in
Illinois becomes whether home rule, as it was intended by its
drafters, will survive judicial interpretations. The Illinois courts, in
an attempt to define the roles to be fulfilled by the various govern-
mental bodies under section 6 of article VII, are losing sight of the
goal of its drafters, which was to avoid restrictive judicial preemp-
tion. The following excerpt is an illuminating statement by the
chairman of the Local Government Committee regarding the intent
93. Interview with legislative assistant to Rep. William Mahar (October 28, 1976).
94. CoMMrrrEE PROPOSALS, vol. VII, supra note 1, at 1656-57. Example 20 involves the
effect of a pre-existing statute on a home rule city's taxing power (paragraphs 3.1(a) and
3.2(a) became respectively sections 6(a) and 6(g) of article VII):
Home-Rule City levies a property tax yielding an amount which would exceed
existing statutory limits on rates of municipal property taxation. The levy is valid.
The power to levy a property tax falls within the home-rule powers granted by
paragraph 3.1(a) and the pre-existing statutory limitation is not effective to dimin-
ish this power. The General Assembly could impose new property-tax rate limita-
tions only by enacting a new statute by a three-fifths vote of each house under
paragraph 3.2(a).
95. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, § 1002(b) (1975).
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and aspirations of the drafters of the home rule provision of the 1970
Illinois constitution:
[Tihe goal of the Committee and the Convention was to be bold,
be innovative, and to create a constitutional system of viable local
government in Illinois which can be a model for the nation. We
have freed our counties and our cities from the shackles of 1870,
we have deposited ultimate sovereignty back in the people, and we
have designed systems of structural flexibility and governmental
interplay between the state and its satellites which should give
Illinois a constitutional framework it can be proud of for the de-
cades to come."
The drafters of the Local Government Article, with the adoption
of the 1970 constitution, accomplished what they set out to do. This
was to remedy deficiencies in the 1870 constitution. The problems
of a modern technological society require solutions which become
effective at the local level. The Local Government Article, as it is
written, attempts to alleviate the pre-home rule problem of inflexi-
ble delegation of narrowly construed legislative power to numerous
governmental units. One is now left to ponder whether one of the
most progressive provisions of the 1970 Illinois constitution will be
emasculated by the Illinois courts, thereby causing Illinois to be in
no better position with regard to local governmental power than it
was under the prior 1870 constitution. The Illinois courts will deter-
mine whether the Illinois home rule provision remains the workable,
innovative system envisaged by its drafters, or whether it will
merely go the way of most other such provisions-rendered ineffec-
tive by the courts.
IRA J. BORNSTEIN
96. Article VII, supra note 7, at 101.
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